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Abstract 
In this article we propose that expertise can be best explained as the interaction of the varying 
constraints/characteristics of the environment and of the individual, framed by the ecological dynamics 
approach. This rationale of expert performance is contrasted with the typical way that science has 
approached the study of expertise: i.e., by looking for constraints, located in the individual, either 
nurture- or nature-based, and related to high performance levels. In ecological dynamics, the base unit of 
analysis for understanding expertise is the individual-environment system. Illustrating this perspective 
with Bob Beamon’s 8.90 m long jump, whose 1968 world-record jump was substantially longer than 
any previous, we argue that expert performers should not be seen as an agglomeration of genes, traits, or 
mental dispositions and capacities. Rather, expert performance can be captured by the dynamically-
varying, functional relationship between the constraints imposed by the environment and the resources 
of each individual performer.  
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Introduction 
Six seconds was all it took for Bob Beamon to leap 
into history. He ran 19 strides down the runway, 
jumped, and landed 8.90 m later. In 1968 in 
Mexico City's University Olympic Stadium, Bob 
Beamon broke the world record for the farthest 
long jump. It remains, arguably, the greatest 
individual feat of the modern Olympics. For 
expertise researchers, questions arise immediately: 
How can we explain such expert performance? 
Was it due to genetics? Was it because of his 
physical characteristics/abilities. Or was it 
deliberate practice scheduling? Did Mexico City's 
altitude cause it? Or was it the wind? Did it happen  
 
 
 
by random chance? Was it due to the stadium’s fast 
runway, or to competitive pressures? 
We tend to respond affirmatively to all these 
questions, declaring that no single factor located 
solely in the performer or environment can 
explain expert performance. As argued 
elsewhere (e.g., Araújo & Davids, 2011), 
expertise and expert performance cannot be 
acquired or possessed by individuals (or be 
located in an environment). Like a rainbow, 
which does not exist in individual drops of 
water, or in an observer’s visual system, or in 
the light rays from the sun, but in the interaction 
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of these components, expertise and expert 
performance exist in the coupling of an 
individual and an environment. That is, 
expertise emerges from the specific interactions 
of system components. In this paper we present 
an ecological (transactional) dynamics rationale 
of expert performance (e.g., Davids, Araújo, 
Seifert, & Orth, 2015), practically illustrated by 
Bob Beamon’s eminent performance.  
An ecological dynamics perspective 
proposes that understanding any individual’s 
performance requires an appreciation of the 
types of behaviors that a performer’s 
environment affords (Gibson, 1979). In this 
way, the individual-environment system 
constitutes the base unit of analysis for 
understanding expertise in performance contexts 
like sports, work, science, education, and the 
performance arts. Ecological dynamics is 
informed partly by a dynamical systems 
approach to performance, which relies on 
mathematical concepts and tools of nonlinear 
dynamics to describe and interpret goal-directed 
behaviors (e.g., Turvey & Shaw, 1995). Goal-
directed behaviors are understood as emergent 
states produced by self-organizing tendencies in 
a system (Kelso, 1995). Finally, and contrasting 
with ideas of Ericsson (2007), who is “interested 
in developing a science (that) should focus on 
athletes who can reproducibly match a given 
level of performance” (p.119), we argue that 
Beamon’s jump is particularly well suited to 
exemplify expert performance precisely because 
of its exceptionality. This analysis of expert 
performance defies the explanatory power of 
most existing theories on expert performance. 
To emphasize our arguments, we look closely at 
information on Beamon’s stand-out performance. 
 
What Was So Exceptional in Beamon’s 
8.90-m Long Jump? 
Bob Beamon caused an abrupt transition in the 
previously incremental progress that served as a 
hallmark for athletics world records (WR) (see 
Figure 1A.). The first official long jump WR 
was verified in 1901 and, until Beamon's jump 
in 1968, the most by which an existing long 
jump WR had been broken was 15 cm. He broke 
the existing WR by 55 cm. The long jump 
record had been broken or equaled 15 times 
between 1901 and 1968. Beamon’s record lasted 
23 years, until Mike Powell jumped 8.95 m, in 
1991, the only regular recorded jump longer 
than Beamon’s. After Powell, the best jumps of 
the year ranged between 8.35 m (the same mark 
as the 1965 world record that Beamon broke in 
1968) and 8.74 m (see Figure 1B).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Official world records of long jump over time (A). Best mark of the year, 1968-1991, and 
after 1991 world record (B). The red ellipse signals the abrupt transition from previous world records to 
Beamon’s 8.90 m jump in 1968. Data for A retrieved October 27, 2018, from https://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Men%27s_long_jump_world_record_progression; data for B retrieved May 31, 2018, from 
https://www.iaaf.org/records/all-time-toplists/jumps/long-jump/outdoor/men/senior. 
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In the Olympic trial, Bob Beamon (age 22, 8.33 m 
as the best personal mark, with about 5 years of 
deliberate practice of long jump; previously he 
played basketball) joined Ralph Boston (age 29, 
8.35 m as the best mark, world record co-holder at 
the time), Lynn Davies (age 26, former Olympic 
champion), and Ter-Ovanesyan (age 30, world 
record co-holder). The sportswriter Schaap labeled 
the competition “as a battle among four of the half-
dozen greatest long jumpers in history” (Davis, 
2015).  
When the competition started, the three 
athletes who preceded Beamon missed their first 
attempt. Then Beamon jumped 8.90 m. He later 
said that his last thought (main intention) before 
hitting the board was “Don’t foul.” He also 
mentioned “my mind was blank during the jump. 
I was as surprised as anybody at the distance.” 
Klaus Beer (age 26) was second (8.19 m), Ralph 
Boston third (8.16 m), Ter-Ovanesyan fourth 
(8.12 m), and Lynn Davies ninth (7.94 m).  
The long jump was the first event of the 
afternoon program and the temperature was 
23ºC. The wind speed on the track measured 2.0 
m/s, the maximum allowed by the rules for 
setting official records. Mexico City is 2,250 m 
above sea level. At that altitude, it has been 
observed that the air is thinner, providing less air 
resistance. Mexico City is also further from the 
center of the Earth, and so gravitational forces 
are smaller. According to Allain (2012) these 
conditions can provide an advantage of up to 7 
cm in every jump, compared to a corresponding 
jump under more typical ambient temperatures 
and pressure at sea level (see also Ward-Smith, 
1986). Clearly, an explanation solely based on 
these physical environmental factors could not 
explain why Beamon’s jump perturbed the 
perspective on long jump performance at that 
time, or the magnitude of the difference from 
previous world records. All the Olympic long 
jump finalists in 1968, including the two WR co-
holders at the time, experienced the same 
environmental conditions, but only Beamon, and 
only once in his life, jumped so far. This 
perturbation to performance records is not 
unknown in long jumpers. For example, after 
Mike Powell broke the world record in 1991, his 
best regular jump was 8.70 m in 1993 (from 
1992 to 2003 when he finished his athletic 
career, the mean value of his annual best 
recorded distances was 8.33 m). 
During the qualifying stage Beamon 
followed the advice of Ralph Boston to take off 
well short of the board to ensure a clean jump. 
This advice was key for him to be in the final, 
because he missed his two previous qualifying 
attempts. The night before the final, Beamon had 
been concerned with personal problems. Shortly 
before his departure for Mexico City, he had lost 
his scholarship at Texas El-Paso University for 
participating, with other African American 
students, in a boycott of an athletics meeting 
against Brigham Young University, a Mormon 
institution whose racial policies disturbed them. 
He also was not getting along with his young 
wife. “Everything was wrong,” he said. “So I 
went into town and had a shot of tequila. Man, 
did I feel loose” (R. Beamon & M. W. Beamon, 
1999). Clearly, this background information 
helps us understand both the cognitions and 
emotions of the performer (self-regulating in an 
Olympic final), as well as the state of the 
environment, in seeking to explain the 
emergence of this performance outcome. 
 
The Base Unit of Analysis for Explaining 
Expertise: The Performer-Environment 
System 
In ecological dynamics, expert performance in 
sport is revealed by solutions that emerge from 
self-organizing system components to satisfy the 
unique set of constraints interacting upon an 
individual performer at that moment in time 
(Araújo et al., 2017) . Due to these continuous 
interactions, explanations of expertise, based 
solely on either personal (e.g., genes, mental 
structures, or psychological processes) or 
environmental constraints (e.g., physical 
conditions or amount of practice undertaken), 
are fundamentally limited (Davids & Baker, 
2007; Hambrick, Macnamara, Campitelli, Ullén, 
& Mosing, 2016).  
This is not a trivial point in the commercial 
world. With respect to environmental 
constraints, there have been recent warnings of 
the dangers of being overwhelmed by what has 
been termed “process industry training” 
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(Renshaw et al., in press). Over the past 10 
years, different types of process training 
programs, predicated on the role of 
environmental constraints, such as cognitive 
training (including meta-cognitive training with 
video games), brain training, perceptual training, 
attention training (including Quiet Eye training), 
or mind training, has boomed, both as a research 
topic and as a commercial product. Referenced 
more generally by Harris, Wilson, and Vines 
(2018), “The overall cognitive training (CT) and 
assessment market is currently worth $1.98 
billion (US) and set to rise to over $8 billion by 
2021 (marketsandmarkets.com, 2017).” (p. 2). 
They continued by arguing that “Commercial 
CT devices are highly appealing for athletes and 
coaches due to their ease of use and eye-catching 
marketing claims. The extent to which this 
training transfers to performance in the sporting 
arena is, however, unclear.” (p. 1).  
These environmentally-biased, process-
training programs are also supported by 
commercial interests in the form of popular 
science books which have not been subject to the 
rigorous peer-review process that academic 
literature has to undergo. Large swaths of the 
digital and conventional media provide broad 
support for the sometimes spurious claims of the 
process-training industry. For example, Moreau, 
Macnamara, & Hambrick (2018) have pointed 
out: “Thousands of scientific articles have been 
published on these topics, which have also 
captured the popular imagination through books 
such as Smarter: The new science of building 
brain power (Hurley, 2014), Mindset: The new 
psychology of success (Dweck, 2006), Grit: The 
power of passion and perseverance (Duckworth, 
2016), and Peak: The new science of expertise 
(Ericsson & Pool, 2017)." (pp. 4-5). They went 
on to note, “Some of these areas of research 
have also spawned lucrative commercial 
ventures. Brain training is a multibillion-dollar 
industry, and commercial mindset interventions 
are used in schools around the world.” (p. 5). 
Their key message resonated with our warnings 
against accepting an environment bias; i.e., that 
process-training programs must be aware of the 
dangers of “overemphasizing the malleability of 
abilities and other traits” (Moreau, 2018).  
In addition, this explanation does not in any 
way endorse the view that hereditary, genetic 
constraints are the dominant characteristic in 
expert performance. This is important, given that 
several existing theoretical approaches are 
dominated by biases towards organismic 
characteristics. Some theories assume that, for 
expertise development, the environment enriches 
internal traits or dispositions that incur relatively 
permanent changes in an individual’s 
capabilities (e.g., Gagné, 2015). According to 
this view, the aim of practice is to increase the 
strength of relevant performance characteristics 
possessed by an individual. Therefore, research 
is needed to understand what has been acquired 
through practice to change an individual’s 
internal state (e.g., Ericsson, Nandogopal, &: 
Roring, 2009), or what transformations have 
occurred to internal entities (e.g., Gagné, 2015). 
For example, Ericsson’s theory of exceptional 
performance (e.g., Ericsson et al., 2009) attempts 
to locate constructs that distinguish experts (e.g., 
deliberate practice forms specific mental 
representations, long-term working memory 
structures), especially in the minds of those 
individuals. These theories seek to differentiate 
skilled individuals from unskilled by identifying 
specific traits exploited during learning. 
Accordingly, expertise, knowledge, and skill are 
viewed as entities possessed by expert 
individuals. Learning results in the acquisition of 
an enhanced trait, or the increased sophistication 
of mental structures (or knowledge). It has been 
argued (e.g., Dunwoody, 2006) that 
contemporary behavioral science, with its 
emphasis on acquisition of enriched internal 
“traits,” has developed an organismic asymmetry 
in its approach to understanding human 
behavior. In this view the environment is simply 
characterized as a backdrop to the demonstration 
of expertise (not as part of the explanation). This 
biased theoretical stance has dominated 
psychology and sport science and is founded on 
separation of the performer from the 
performance context. It logically detaches 
content from context—and abilities from 
situations—in which expert performance occurs 
(Araújo & Davids, 2011).  
Therefore, it is not surprising that several 
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research programs based on this type of 
contemporary theorizing claim to have identified 
constructs within specific individuals that 
distinguish experts from non-experts (e.g., based 
on genes, gifts, talents, see Hambrick et al., 
2016, for a review). This dualistic view of 
dominant intrinsic characteristics and 
environmental influences encourages conceptual 
divisions. The result is intractable problems 
which emerge under careful consideration about 
how internal “properties” of experts become 
connected to the environment (Turvey & Shaw, 
1995). For example, where are such internal 
constructs located in expert nervous systems 
(talents, mental representations, traits, and 
dispositions) and how did they originate? How 
do environment-individual interactions occur 
that explain those traits? How can such 
environment-individual interactions that form 
traits be tested? Put simply, environmental tasks 
where internal “traits” are expressed tend to be 
excluded from an explanation of expertise, or in 
some cases interpreted with a task description 
that is not commensurate with measured internal 
variables (Hoffman, Ward, Feltovich, DiBello, 
Fiore, & Andrews, 2014).  
The previous section highlighted a 
configuration of performer, environment, and 
task constraints that interacted to make Bob 
Beamon’s expert performance possible. How 
can an explanation of expert performance in 
sport (exemplified here by long jumping) 
simultaneously entail constraints related to the 
performer and the environment? To performance 
analysts in athletics, Beamon was a slim, long-
legged athlete with an inconsistent technique 
(Davis, 2015). This means that on some 
occasions his technique facilitated good 
performances, and in others it did not. The 
influence of altitude, weather conditions, his 
weight/strength ratio, his psychological state due 
to agitation the night before, the intense 
competition with the other high-level athletes in 
competition, the fast runway of Olympic 
Stadium, and his past variable sport practice 
experiences may have all coalesced to support 
his performance at that single moment. All these 
constraints may have influenced his actions to 
self-organize in a performance that cannot be 
explained by referring to any single component 
of performance individually. Self-organization 
can be identified in a system (here the 
performer-environment system in sport) by 
capturing certain properties (e.g., multi-stability, 
hysteresis; see Kelso, 1995). These properties do 
not exist in the components alone but emerge 
spontaneously from person-environment 
interactions. 
The key message here is that self-
organization does not signify the effects of a 
sum of weights of different correlated variables. 
Rather self-organization tendencies can result in 
an emergent system solution that is richer and 
more functional than the sum of the parts. When 
a system establishes a state (i.e., Beamon 
performing the long jump task in the Olympic 
Stadium) as a result of the dynamical 
interactions among several interacting system 
components, self-organization tendencies 
causally facilitate such a state. Behaviors that 
emerge may be temporarily assembled and are 
different from the elemental components that 
make up the system. In this way, human 
performance can be understood as an expression 
of self-organizing tendencies under constraints, 
rather than organization exclusively imposed 
from the inside (e.g., feelings, speed, technique, 
intentions) or the outside (e.g., the altitude, fast 
runway, competitive pressure).  
But how do the many interacting 
components of such systems exploit self-
organization tendencies? It seems that the 
answer lies in the surrounding patterns of 
stimulus energy (which provides information for 
action, see below) in an environment (i.e., 
information in Gibson’s [1979] sense) that 
pressure a complex system to change, resulting 
in the spontaneous emergence of distinctive 
patterns (behavior) between system components 
(Davids, Araújo, Hristovski, Passos, & Chow, 
2012). The role of adaptive capacities and self-
organizing tendencies is reflected in the variety 
of behaviors that individuals can exploit during 
performance—and their ability to vary those 
behaviors from trial to trial to achieve superior 
performance outcomes (see Davids et al., 2015). 
Adaptive movement variability provides the 
capacity of individuals to achieve high 
 Araújo and Davids (2018)       Expert Performance and the Performer-Environment System  
https://www.journalofexpertise.org                                                                                                                                                                      149 
Journal of Expertise / December 2018 / vol. 1, no. 3 
performance outcomes under perturbations 
within dynamic performance environments (e.g., 
successfully hit the take-off board during a run-
up in varied environmental conditions).  
The scale of adaptation to constraints is 
intentionally regulated by performers, depending 
on the nature of dynamic performance 
environments (Araújo, Davids, & Hristovski, 
2006). For example, in soccer, performers may 
intentionally constrain their actions, depending 
on available affordances in a performance 
context, to shoot, dribble, or pass the ball. 
During performance there are variants of each 
action that emerge during sub-phases of play, 
constrained by co-positioning and movements of 
teammates and opponents, weather conditions, 
field surface, properties of the ball, current score 
of the match, team strategies, and tactics 
(Davids, Güllich Araüjo, & Shuttleworth, 2017).  
In contrast, in performance of self-paced 
timing tasks without direct opponent 
interactions, such as climbing or long jumping, 
task performance is more stable, and there are 
only a small—but influential—number of 
variations in conditions of the performance 
environment. In long jumping, these variations 
include properties of the track, board, air 
resistance (altitude), and weather conditions 
such as ambient temperature, and wind velocity 
and direction (Scott, Li, & Davids, 1997; 
Greenwood, Davids, & Renshaw, 2013; 
McClosker et al., in press). When running to 
place the foot on a target, an athlete’s kinematics 
and kinetics of locomotion vary in each attempt, 
and indeed from stride to stride (captured in 
variables like speed, stride lengths, lower limb 
joint angles, and dynamics) (Renshaw & Davids, 
2006).  
Moreover, this approach can expand our 
understanding of phenomena in performance of 
activities such as music or chess (for an 
ecological theory applied to chess, see Vicente 
& Wang, 1998). Our argument is that 
performance solutions implicate constitutive 
causation provided by self-organization and 
emergence among influencing factors. These 
influencing factors are both internal and external 
to the performer. For example, van Harreveld, 
Wagenmakers, & van der Maas (2007), showed 
that skill differences between chess players 
become less predictive of competitive outcomes 
as time pressure increases. Also, Gobet and 
Simon (1996) compared the performance of the 
grandmaster Garry Kasparov under normal 
tournament circumstances to his performance 
when Kasparov was playing a simul (i.e., 
playing several players at the same time) and the 
time to contemplate his moves was restricted. 
Gobet and Simon (1996) showed that 
Kasparov’s chess rating (a numerical measure of 
skill) drops from 2,750 to 2,646 when he has to 
play faster. Calderwood, Klein, and Crandall 
(1988) asked grandmasters to rate the quality of 
moves made in fast (blitz) and slow games. 
Their results showed that greater time pressure 
decreased the quality of play. Moreover, Chabris 
and Hearst (2003) have shown that even 
grandmasters make more and bigger mistakes 
under conditions where they have less time than 
usual to select their moves. Clearly, 
environmental time pressure and task type 
influence the performance context in meaningful 
ways and must be taken into account in an 
explanation of expert performance in chess.  
Regarding more tragic anecdotal evidence, 
during the 41st Chess Olympiad in 
Tromsø, Norway, 2014, Kurt Meier, a Swiss-
born member of the Seychelles team, collapsed 
during his final match of the chess marathon 
two-week contest. Hours later, a player from 
Uzbekistan was found dead in his hotel room in 
central Tromsø. This Olympiad involved 1,800 
competitors from 174 countries, accompanied by 
more than 1,000 coaches, delegates and fans. 
The event sees players compete in national 
teams over 11 rounds, often playing matches that 
last for up to six hours, and claims a worldwide 
online audience of tens of millions (Addley, 
2014). While the two men’s deaths were 
attributed to cardiovascular causes, they raise 
questions about the mental and physical stress 
that tournaments place on players. Meier is not 
the first player to die in the middle of a chess 
match, in a tournament environment. In 2000, 
Vladimir Bagirov, a Latvian grandmaster, had a 
fatal heart attack during a tournament in Finland, 
while in the same year, another Latvian, Aivars 
Gipslis, while playing in Berlin, suffered a 
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stroke from which he later died. One of 
Australia's leading players, Ian Rogers, retired 
abruptly from chess in 2007, saying he had been 
warned by his doctors that the stress of top-level 
competition was causing him serious health 
problems. The tournament environment is 
characterized by uncertainty and intense 
competition, coinciding with the high levels of 
motivation to succeed that competitors 
have. Potentially stressful tasks, such as those in 
which expert performance has been studied, tend 
to be ones where competitive performance is 
public and feedback (and consequent judgments 
by the audience) is immediate (Murphy, 2012). 
In short, an ecological dynamics approach to 
expert performance is a promising avenue to 
conceptualize how a number of interacting 
constraints—personal (e.g., age), task (e.g., 
competitive chess) and environmental (e.g., 
intense coverage in the media)—interact to 
shape behaviors in every performance domain, 
not just in the sports that get the most media 
attention. 
 
Expert Performance Explained by the 
Ecological Dynamics Approach 
Ecological dynamics emphasizes the laws and 
symmetry conditions at nature’s ecological 
scale, implying the detection of environmental 
information that is used to guide behaviors. 
Gibson (1979) attempted to identify the 
relationship between the structured energy 
distributions of the environment available to a 
performer’s perceptual systems and the 
environmental properties causally responsible 
for that structure. This conceptualization of the 
ecophysical basis of performance behaviors 
underpins the regulation of actions and should 
not be viewed as some sort of “New Age” 
interpretation of mystical energy sources 
available in the environment. Information for 
action, in Gibson’s sense, underpins human 
behaviors which can be explained with reference 
to the laws of physics and the evolution of 
perceptual systems designed to detect and utilize 
available energy sources as information to guide 
human behaviors.  
For example, optical energy, in the form of 
light. is reflected from surrounding objects, 
slanted and textured surfaces, and features of the 
environment. Light is reflected in straight lines 
and exists in highly structured energy 
distributions called an optical array (Gibson, 
1979). Similarly, acoustic energy provides sound 
as vibrations that propagate an audible pressure 
wave, which can help humans locate the 
presence of an approaching object. Gibson 
(1979) argued that there are properties from the 
surrounding energy flows, which remain 
constantly available for detection, despite 
transformations associated with movement of 
observers and the environment; i.e., they are 
invariants. Despite the continuous changes to 
energy distributions surrounding a performer, 
invariants provide information about the 
environment. The key point concerns the 
relationship between an individual and a 
performance environment, according to Gibson 
(1979). He proposed that the optic energy array 
detected by the observer offers information for 
visually regulating actions. Available 
information sources allow a performer to 
directly and unambiguously perceive the layout 
and properties of objects, events, and features 
within a performance environment. The 
patterned energy distribution in the environment 
informs an actor about its relevant properties 
that can support action. In research on the event 
of long jumping, previous studies have 
attempted to identify these information sources 
available energy distributions. These studies 
have suggested how optical information from 
objects located near the take-off board 
(Greenwood, Davids & Renshaw, 2014), as well 
as light reflected from the take-off board itself 
(e.g., Scott, Li & Davids, 1997; De Rugy et al., 
2002; Renshaw & Davids, 2006), can help 
skilled jumpers regulate their gait during the 
approach phase.  
For Gibson, the process of detecting 
information from the surrounding energy arrays 
is carried out by a functional system distributed 
throughout an active performer. Expertise in 
perceiving key perceptual variables that can 
regulate actions emerges as a result of extensive 
periods of practice and training in specific 
performance environments (Davids, Güllich, 
Araújo & Shuttleworth, 2017). Skilled 
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adjustments of peripheral organs, such as turning 
the eyes and head at the right moment to regulate 
the locomotion system, play as significant a role 
in direct perception. In Gibson’s (1979) theory, 
perception of the environment is not inferred, 
nor interpreted/construed as internalized activity 
of the brain and the nervous system. Rather 
perception of information from surrounding 
energy arrays is directly perceived and coupled 
to actions. This description of the environment is 
not achieved in individual-neutral physical terms 
(e.g., mass, length, time), but in functional (goal-
related) terms (e.g., Araújo et al., 2014).  
Another major idea from Gibson (1979) was 
that the environment is perceived in behavioral 
terms (i.e., affordances) which are defined as 
possibilities for action offered by the 
environment. His ideas imply that performers 
perceive objects, surfaces, other athletes, or 
events by what they offer or demand in terms of 
action opportunities. Affordances are properties 
of performer-environment systems that can be 
exploited in patterns of stimulus energy 
(information) and that can, therefore, be directly 
perceived (i.e., not mentally mediated). 
Affordances are goal relevant descriptions of the 
environment, and perceiving an affordance is to 
perceive how one can act in a particular set of 
performance conditions.  
Perceiving an affordance includes detecting 
information about the environment, and also the 
action capabilities (capacities or skills) that 
attune performers to some affordances and not to 
others. The concept of affordances cuts across 
the incompatible objective-subjective divide 
(Heft, 2013), and is located at the athlete-
environment system (transactional) level. For 
example, in long jumping, the eyes of a jumper 
can detect the light reflected off surrounding 
objects and surfaces—the take-off board, the pit, 
a windsock placed near the jumping area—
providing each performer with information for 
regulating functional actions during the run-up 
and jump phases of performance, as can be 
captured by (Greenwood et al. 2013). The rate of 
dilation of an image of an approaching object on 
an individual’s eye can provide time-to-
interception information (placing the foot in the 
take-off board), mathematically modelled as 
Tau, without the need to mentally compute 
either distance or speed of the object to intercept 
it (Lee, Lishman, & Thomson, 1982).  
According to Gibson (1979) one’s actions 
guide the detection of information for further 
adjustments of behavior. The cyclical 
relationship between action and perception 
implies that information presented in a sport task 
(e.g., gaps, distances, angles, obstacles, target 
sizes, equipment) will be used to regulate an 
athlete’s performance behaviors (see Harrison, 
Turvey, & Frank, 2016, for modeling). From this 
viewpoint, expertise is not defined by an 
athlete’s fixed set of genetic or acquired 
components, but rather by a dynamically varying 
relationship captured by the constraints imposed 
by the task experienced, the physical and social 
environment, and the personal characteristics of 
a performer (Araújo & Davids, 2011).  
 
Conclusion  
Expertise viewed as a more functional 
relationship of an individual with a performance 
environment is distinct from theories which 
emphasize the repetition of a particular 
movement pattern or coordination mode through 
constant practice (Ericsson et al., 2009). It 
recognizes the need for each individual learner 
to adapt to, and satisfy, the unique array of 
interaction constraints impinging on the learner 
at a specific moment. Expert performers are able 
constantly, and subtly, to re-invent themselves as 
key constraints change (Davids et al., 2015). 
Due to inherent nonlinearities in complex 
adaptive systems, the amount of time needed to 
achieve an individual's potential cannot be 
precisely specified; e.g., due to 10,000 hours of 
deliberate practice (Phillip, Davids, Renshaw, & 
Portus, 2010; Macnamara et al., 2016). An 
individual's potential is not static, but rather is 
dynamic, and continuously open to ongoing 
influences of task, individual and environmental 
constraints; e.g., genes, motivation, practice, and 
availability of facilities and coaching support 
(Davids, et al., 2015)  
For example, the idea of (deliberate) practice 
as an influence of the environment concerned 
how context enriches the performers’ abilities 
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(e.g., Ericsson et al, 2009). This approach 
contrasts with the explanation that individuals 
and contexts co-determine each other through 
ecological practice (Davids et al., 2015). Both 
individual and environment—physical or 
social—have the potential to be affected and 
transformed by these interactions. In ecological 
dynamics, experts are not an agglomerate of 
physical or mental traits, but active individuals 
engaged in ongoing dynamical transactions with 
their functionally defined environments. 
Expertise is not a possession acquired by an 
individual, nor a fixed property of a performer, 
but rather a dynamically varying relationship 
captured by the constraints of the environment 
and those of the performer of a task (Araújo & 
Davids, 2011).  
Ecological dynamics emphasizes 
understanding of the transaction between 
affordances (opportunities for action) and skills, 
i.e., how performers become attuned to perceive 
key variables that specify goal achievement. 
Through exploratory, varied actions in specific 
contexts, perceptual systems become 
progressively attuned to some affordances and 
not to others (Vicente & Wang, 1998). The 
variables detected become more subtle, 
elaborate, and precise with task-specific 
experience and are successfully coupled to 
actions (for an ecological dynamics explanation 
of learning, see Davids et al., 2012).  
Key constraints on the performance of expert 
long jumpers like Bob Beamon, such as 
technique, altitude, weather conditions, 
psychological and emotional states, peer 
competition, the fast runway of Olympic 
Stadium, and varied sport experiences, may have 
all converged to support performance at a single 
moment in time. Ecologically constrained self-
organization tendencies have the power to 
explain emergent performances such as Bob 
Beamon’s jump, which caused an abrupt 
transition in long jump. This explanation implies 
how more outstanding achievements and 
outcomes in sport may emerge as constraints 
converging to shape performances destined to be 
remembered for a lifetime. In short, what makes 
one individual’s performance more expert than 
another is not some possessed ability, but its 
contextualized functional value during goal-
directed behavior.  
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